Tuesday, October 2, 2018

ESSAY#1: Second Amendment

INTRODUCTION
I wrote the following essay in response to a series of lengthy posts on Facebook (I say lengthy, they covered 4 pages on Microsoft Word) in favor of increased gun control legislation, all written by the same author (name removed below), whom I know, following the tragic school shooting in Parkland, FL. As part of his discourse, the author had proposed a plan where 12 witness signatures from fellow law-abiding citizens would be necessary to attest to an individual's fitness/trustworthiness to purchase weapons above some magnitude (though I can't remember at the moment what limit of magnitude was proposed as the cut-off, though it may have been semi-automatic). It took me about 2 weeks to complete the below essay addressing the other author's arguments and outlining my own. I found it an insightful exercise, delving into the philosophical foundations of the two sides -- I hope that you find the essay digestible, helpful, and productive.


ESSAY
Sorry for the delay, [removed]. You wrote a lot, it was a lot to respond to. I will be posting my response in sections for ease of reading and replying.

1

I don't believe that you actually addressed my critique of your 12-witness plan, that it is based on the notion that the right to bear arms is a privilege granted by government. In my usage of the words, 'rights' and 'privileges' are opposite terms.

Rights originate from God, and include life, liberty, and private property. All men, being created equal, possess them by virtue of their Nature, not by their own declaration, education, approbation, or legislation. Rights can be claimed by all individually at the expense of no one else, and do not change with time. Rights are therefore not rewarded, but they can be lost by violation (either as violator or violated) and restored by consent.

Violations of rights include physical harm or death, enslavement by another, and theft or destruction of his property and/or industry; and nearly always require an application of force. The Moral Law of Nature (or Morality) prompts us to avoid violating the rights of others, but Man is imperfect and capable of choosing contrary to Morality, and efforts to violate the rights of others are made by some.

Before the establishment of government and jurisdiction, the responsibility to secure/protect one's own rights belonged to the individual him/herself, as well as the right to use prudent application of force (up to lethal if necessary) to defend him/herself and his/her rights in response to such attempts at violation. This constitutes what I call the right of self-preservation or self-defense.

When government is established, much of the responsibility of protection/security and the authority to use the force necessary to perform it are delegated by the individuals' consent to the government, usually manifested as law enforcement and military -- This is one of the reasons why government is by nature an entity of force and why security is one of the true primary purposes of government. Violations of rights are codified into laws, and become crimes, per the political process adopted by the society.

The question then arises as to the completeness of this delegation of security to the government, and whether it includes the right of self-preservation and the prudent application of force necessary to perform it. If that delegation were complete, then the individual would have no right to self-preservation in any situation. The Second Amendment clarifies that no, the individual remains the ultimate defender of his/her rights in the event that the government fails to protect, regardless of the size of the threat, from a single intruder in the house up to invasion by an enemy government. 

Privileges (mistakenly called 'rights' in many instances), on the other hand, don't come from Nature, but originate in the first place from government. They are benefits, favors, gifts of special treatment from people to other people, be it to another individual or group or entity, via governmental edict. At their core, privileges are arbitrary -- "the government giveth, and the government taketh away" at its will.

2

Admittedly, [removed], I do not understand your definition of the right to bear arms. On the one hand, you explain that mass shooters take advantage of the right to bear arms as cover to obtain firearms, which I believe is true for those without previous criminal history. You excellently explain some of the subtleties of rights, expounding how freedom is something really only enjoyed by the responsible (citing the exception of babies and young children), and how people who violate the rights of others can legally loose rights which were previously protected (using the case of felons as your example). You also say that people with evil intentions shouldn't have the right to bear arms, which I agree. You even phrase the dilemma in what I would consider a loosely conservative way: "how do you [or a seller for that matter] determine if someone without a criminal record can be trusted to obey the law with a gun?" I thought that your question could be interpreted as acknowledging the right to bear arms as a pre-existing individual right, and as adopting a traditional 'innocent until proven guilty' approach, which respected the rights of the individual, but at the same time was searching for some practical due process method in order to only remove rights from violators or imminent violators but not innocents or 'trustworthy,' as you call them. I agree with that kind of approach on this issue. 

I noted however that in spite of this apparent understanding, your 12-witness plan actually adopts the exact opposite 'guilty until proven innocent' approach, which, although well-intended, does not respect the natural rights of the innocent. 


On the other hand, you conflate the right to bear arms with something you call the 'right to kill. ' What is the 'right to kill'? From your response, I gather that it is something possessed by the murderer (you do not specify if it is possessed by the innocent), that the murderer can exercise it by committing murder (something beyond the notion of killing in self-defense), that it thereby provides what you call 'advantage' to the murderer over the rights of others, which 'advantage' is directly proportional to the murderer's capacity to commit murder, which you describe as being directly related to the type of firearm selected by the murderer, and that this 'right to kill' (under your conflated definition of 'the right to bear arms') is protected by the Second Amendment and therefore defended by those who defend the Second Amendment.

From here, you appear to conclude that the 'right to bear arms'/'right to kill' of the shooter stands in direct opposition to the student's right to life, and that America therefore 'favors mass shooters' as long as it (America) decides to continue granting them (the shooters) their right to kill under the guise of defending Second Amendment rights, and that Second Amendment advocates (whether NRA or otherwise) are morally objectionable people, "complicit in aiding domestic enemies," as you say, and therefore "[enemies] of the American people" and "against students." This logic could only make sense by accepting the notion that murder is a right, and that it was protected by the Second Amendment.

I agree that advocating in favor of someone's right to murder would be egregious, if this right to murder existed. But of course it does not. Since the right to murder does not exist, then no indivudal possesses it. This also addresses your comment about military having advantage over the citizenry -- since no individual had the right to murder in the first, so the right to murder could not be delegated to government, to law enforcement, or to the military, which is evident by the fact that police officers and military personnel are not actually allowed to murder. You of course know this as well. By your own clarification, you know that this 'right to murder' doesn't exist nor is it protected by the Second Amendment, because you write that "the 2nd Amendment implies the right to bear arms is to provide security" and that "the right to bear arms does not give people the right to violate to rights of others, ... to commit crimes with those arms, ...[or] to murder innocent civilians." I agree with that, and all Second Amendment advocates that I know agree with that as well.

I therefore find it more than a little despicable, as well as unproductive, to waste words casting someone as morally reprehensible for no other demonstrable reason than he/she/they disagree with you politically, which seems to be the case here. Second Amendment advocates, at least the ones that I know, do not believe what you say they believe (that people have a right to murder which is defended by the Second Amendment), and you have presented no other evidence to the contrary. At the very least, I find it difficult to understand how such baseless accusations are in line with any expressed desire to engage in discussion, since in my experience they have generally been used for the purpose of intimidating and silencing opposition.

3a

Also, I don't understand your strategy for when you appeal to Originalism to define terms, and when you do not.

For example, you did not claim Originalism with your interpretation of 'militia' when you asked "if gun owners don't have to join the militia, aren't they getting away with something," suggesting that the Second Amendment only protects ownership of guns related to military service. And rightfully so, because that is not an Originalist position. George Mason (co-author of the Second Amendment) argued during the Virginia's Ratification Convention (1788) that the militia as understood in his time was "the whole people." This is significant because a militia at the time was understood to mean "each and every abled-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted)" as per the Act of May 8, 1792 (Congress' first militia Act). Clearly, the militia is a subpart of "the whole people," but it is "the whole people" who possess the right to bear arms in the first place. Support for this can further be found in the wording of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which enpowers Congress to form Army and Navy, but only to call forth and organize (not form) militias, suggesting that the militias were already existing. Appropriate, since the Founding Fathers viewed the right to bear arms as a pre-existing individual right.

3b

Also, you also did not claim Originalism when you said that the word 'regulated' in the phrase "A well regulated militia" was actually a modifier for the phrase "right to bear arms," in order to say that "A well regulated militia" implied that "the right to bear arms is limited." And rightfully so, because that is just incorrect reading of English sentence structure, much less Originalism. "Regulated" is modifying "militia" in that phrase, and is not in the same clause as the phrase "right to bear arms." I agree that the Second Amendment is not limitless, but it is not because of this. 

3c

Also, you did not claim Originalism in your interpretation of 'tyranny' as simply meaning "[involving] the cruel use of power," thereby declaring "mass shooters [as] America's new tyrants." And rightfully so, because this would not be an Originalist position either. James Madison wrote: "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elected, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny" (Federalist No.47). Tyrannies are tyrannical governments, and tyrants are the heads of such governments. This does not describe a mass shooter.

I would of course concede that both tyrants and mass shooters both violate the rights of others. At the same time, there is no question that people like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Kim Jong-un, Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, or even (to take a less dramatic example) George III, whom I would argue were actual tyrants per Madison's definition (and therefore, tyrants in the Originalist sense), are exponentially more dangerous to the rights (including, many times, the lives) of a much greater number of people than mass shooters. None of this is to say that mass shooters are somehow less disgusting for not being tyrants, but it should stand to reason that if we want to prevent mass shootings, the most deadly of which in US history (Las vegas shooting) killed 59 people at a time, then we should certainly want to prevent tyrants, the 13th most deadly of which in the world from the 20th century on (per thedailybeast) was Enver Pasha of Turkey, whose regime killed an estimated 1.1-2.5 million people in 5 years. Again, I'm not pleading for mass shooters. Mass shootings are bad. I am absolutely in favor of preventing mass shootings. I am saying however that it would make sense that we should not want tyrants (in the Originalist sense) as well.

This is important because many Second Amendment advocates still argue that one of the purposes of the Second Amendment was so that the citizenry could defend themselves against James Madison's definition of tyranny, particularly should the United States government go the way of all other democracies in world history, and become tyrannical. And in this they would be correct -- when writing about arms, the Founding Fathers most frequently wrote about the people defending themselves against tyranny. You, [removed], actually disregard the Originalist notion of tyranny as a combination of old-fashioned and stupid, claiming it to be something about which Second Amendment advocates "fantasize," and against which muskets are sufficient to fight. It is clear that you don't take seriously the idea of tyranny in the Originalist sense, only the "contemporary interpretation" I suppose.

3d

In addition, you did not claim Originalism for your larger definition of the debate, which was that the Second Amendment debate is "basically over which weapons [and I think you mean, which firearms] are considered 'arms.'" And rightfully so, because an Originalist would not frame the debate in that way. 'Gun ownership' falls under the umbrella of the 'right to bear arms,' not the other way around. While guns were important tools, the principle of the Second Amendment for the Founders was never about guns per se, but about natural law, particularly the right of the individual to self-preservation, the right to repel force with force in the event that the society fails to prevent it.

For an Originalist then, the debate would be whether the government has the power to decide with what you are allowed to defend yourself, or not. While I agree with you that Originalists call for amendments to change the Constitution, I do not believe that Originalist would argue that "newer weapons require newer amendments," as you surmise, but that it would take an amendment to repeal the Second Amendment. Thus taking this more Originalist position that the Second Amendment is about self-preservation, I believe that Originalists would thereby pose a question regarding gun control similar to your earlier one, "how can we keep guns out of the hands of bad people without limiting the right to bear arms of the good people?"

It seems to me that pursuing the debate in your terms (that it's about "which weapons are considered 'arms') would require one to concede that 1) the debate is in fact about guns and not about self-preservation, and therefore conduct the debate in what I would call non-originalist terms; and that 2) government therefore, yes, has the right to decide with what you are allowed to defend yourself, which is also the opposite of what the Second Amendment says, and therefore not Originalist either.

In any case, our discussion would no longer be about looking for due process solutions that target the rights of violators or imminent violators only, but becomes a discussion looking for arbitrary parameters to implement blanket bans of certain weapons from all citizens, including from innocent citizens. I believe that such an approach punishes innocent citizens, and disregards their rights and value as individuals.

3e

You do however claim Originalism for your interpretation of "arms." As discussed, your purpose in defining "arms" seems to be to determine which firearms are protected and not protected by the Second Amendment, which implies the acceptance of the premise that the principle of the Second Amendment is gun ownership and not self-preservation, which is not an Originalist premise. Without the principle of self-preservation, then it is just about guns. I therefore see no small irony in the appeal to Originalism to guise authority for a point that is only pertinent within a Non-Originalist argument.

Your interpretation also breaks with American constitutional legal tradition. As Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote (speaking of the argument that "only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment"), "We [the Supreme Court] do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communication..., and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search..., the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the Founding" (District of Columbia v. Heller (No.07-290), which I highly recommend for future reading on the topic).

Let's examine, however, your claim to Originalism in this case. You place great emphasis that there were only "muskets and revolvers" in 1791 when the Second Amendment was passed. You then claim that muskets and revolvers denote the exclusive meaning of the word "arms" as used in the Second Amendment, and not modern firearms. This is what you claim is the Originalist view, I presume because it uses history to reach the conclusion, which has proven to indeed be a novel approach among your methods for defining words, at least during this analysis.

While I do not dispute your summary of the status of mainstream firearms technology at the time of the passing of the Second Amendment, and I concede that Originalism appeals to history to interpret the Constitution, I imagine that you would agree that the presence of muskets and revolvers in 1791 is circumstantial evidence at best, and does not by itself establish what the people of the time were thinking or believed about anything, much less about what they thought or believed about the right to bear arms. In order to establish this, you would need to provide other supporting sources from the time, which would require research, but I imagine that you could learn their views because we have tons of collections of writings from the people of that period.

To demonstrate what I mean, I'll suggest that the word "arms" as used in the Second Amendment does not even refer exclusively to firearms. I offer as my evidence the Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Ed, from 1773, which defined "arms" as "weapons of offence, or armour of defence," and the New and Complete Law Dictionary from 1771, which defined "arms" as "any thing that a man wears for his defense, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another." Notice the editions of the books provided are from the pertinent time period, and found in the American Colonies at the time just before the Revolutionary War. Originalists would read this and conclude that "arms," even in the way it is used in the Second Amendment, likely did not only refer to firearms.

If we were to consider only the circumstantial evidence you cite (that muskets and revolvers were what they had in 1791), and if we then brainstorm: Could not one just as easily reason that muskets and revolvers were the military-grade weapons at the time, and therefore even military-grade weapons are protected by the Second Amendment? Could not one just as easily reason that we fought the Revolution with muskets and revolvers, which more or less matched the level of firearms technology possessed by the British at that time, and therefore whatever weapons our enemies have could be covered by the Second Amendment? I am of course not advocating any of these interpretations simply by mentioning them in a brainstorm, but my point is, without the clarification/confines of supporting evidence, the same piece of information can yield competing rationales. At this point, what I know is that Originalism does not depend solely on inferences from circumstantial evidence if it can be avoided. The evidence I am familiar with shows that "arms" in the late 18th-century meant the same as it means today, "weapons of attack, armor of defense." This would be closer to an Originalist view.

3f

So, why then claim Originalism at all? Of the five examples I analyzed, you claimed Originalism for only one of them -- and rightfully so, as I pointed, since you did not hold Originalist views for any of them. Yet in the case of the word "arms," where you still did not actually hold an Originalist view, you nevertheless still attempted to invoke Originalism. What propose then did your claim to Originalism serve in your explanations?

I think there are clues in the two following quotes:

1) "How does the 2nd Amendment and the Parkland shooting interact? Simply because some people think that the AR-15 style rifle he used, and the cartridges he used, were referenced by the 2nd Amendment written 227 years ago. But they weren't. Only in a vague abstract category of "arms," which clearly needs specificity now. That massacre wasn't performed with a musket, it was performed with an AR-15 style rifle, which isn't mentioned anywhere in the 2nd Amendment."

2) "...and since it's the NRA making the argument for a non-originalist interpretation of the 2nd Amendment, then don't all the deaths of innocent civilians in mass shootings fall on the person or people making that non-originalist argument? Should the NRA have to identify the bodies of school shooting victims? Should the NRA have to pay for hospital bills, funeral costs? They're the ones okay with the status quo, they're the ones who insist on a non-originalist interpretation of the 2nd Amendment..."

On the one hand, it is nearly impossible for me to read these explanations in any way so as to not imply that you are directly accusing Second Amendment advocates of being directly responsible for the Parkland shooting, specifically for their interpretation of the word "arms." Before, you were accusing them of being "complicit in aiding domestic enemies," but now they are murderers themselves.

On the other hand, you still provide zero evidence to corroborate your accusation apart from the fact that the people you are accusing do not share your political opinion, which is truly fascistic, and disgusting. I hope, [removed], that you will abandon this tactic in the future. It is unbecoming, to say nothing of unproductive.

Wednesday, August 15, 2018

Founding Father's Library (FFL), Updated#3

I indicated during my last FFL update that I was reading Cicero. I was going to read De Re Publica (On the Commonwealth) first, then De Legibus (On the Laws), then De Officiis (On the Moral Duties). However, due to my preference for audiobooks, I ended up reading On the Laws first (via Libravox), then On Moral Duties (via Libravox), and then On the Commonwealth (via Online Library of Liberty website). I started reading Cicero's Orations (a 4-volume collection of Cicero's speeches and defenses available on the Online Library of Liberty website), but ultimately decided to take a break from the Ancients for a bit. On the side, I listened to Ron Chernow's biography on Alexander Hamilton, during which I read that Hamilton was supposed to have really liked David Hume, another author who is listed in the Founding Father Library. So, I began listening to (via Libravox) and reading (via Project Gutenberg) his earliest produced work from the FFL list, which was A Treatise of Human Nature.  I have since learned that Cicero's De Oratione (the last work by Cicero I have yet to read from the FFL) is actually not the Orations which I had started earlier, but a different work entitled On the Ideal Orator. I will return to read that soon, because Cicero has been glorious to read. Maybe someday, I will return to read the Orations as well, but probably not in the foreseeable future, as there are many other works to read that are on the FFL.

Also, in order to conserve space, I have decided to attempt to keep my running reading list from the Founding Father's Library on one post which I will update by crossing off the titles of books that I finish, while the Updates (my little introductions and explanations at the tops of each Updates) will be new posts. I hope that that will not be confusing. 

Founding Father's Library 
(in chronological order by date of publication)

Ancient
Undated -- Apology -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Cratylus -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Citias -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Crito -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Laws -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Phaedo -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Phaedrus -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Philebus -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- The Republic -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- The Seventh Letter -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Sophist -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Statesman -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Symposium -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Theaetetus -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
360 BC-- Timaeus -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
370 BC-- Parmenides -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Charmides, or Temperance -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Euthydemus -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Euthyphro -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Gorgias -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Ion -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Laches, or Courage -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Lysis, or Friendship -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)
380 BC-- Meno -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)

380 BC-- Protagoras -- Plato (c. 427-347 BC)

De Legibus -- Cicero (106-43 BC) -- finished between 04/05/2018 and 07/01/2018
De Officiis -- Cicero (106-43 BC) -- finished between 04/05/2018 and 07/01/2018
De Oratione -- Cicero (106-43 BC)
De Republica -- Cicero (106-43 BC) -- finished 07/01/2018

History of Rome -- Titus Livius (Livy) (59BC - AD17)

Roman Lives -- 
Plutarch (c. 46-125)

History of Germany -- Tacitus (c. 56-120)
The Histories -- Tacitus (c. 56-120)

1500s
1531 -- Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy (1531) -- Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)
1532 -- The Prince (1532) -- Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)

1591-- Henry VI, Pt.II -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1591-- Henry VI, Pt.III -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1592-- Henry VI, Pt.I -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1593-- Richard III -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1593-- The Comedy of Errors -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1594-- Titus Andronicus -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1594-- The Taming of the Shrew -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1595-- Two Gentlemen of Verona -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1595-- Love's Labour's Lost -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1595-- Romeo and Juliet -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1596-- Richard II -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1596-- A Midsummer Night's Dream -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1597-- King John -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1597-- The Merchant of Venice -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1598-- Henry IV, Pt.I -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1598-- Henry IV, Pt.II -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1599-- Much Ado About Nothing -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1599-- Henry V -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)

1600s
1600-- Julius Caesar -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1600-- As You Like It -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1600-- Twelfth Night -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1601-- Hamlet -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1601-- The Merry Wives of Windsor -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1602-- Troilus and Cressida -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1603-- All's Well That Ends Well -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1605-- Measure for Measure -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1605-- Othello -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1605 -- The Advancement of Learning (1605) --Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
1606-- King Lear -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1606-- MacBeth -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1607-- Antony and Cleopatra -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1608-- Coriolanus -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1608-- Timon of Athens -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1609-- Pericles -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)

1610-- Cymbeline -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1611-- The Winter's Tale -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1612-- The Tempest -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)
1613-- Henry VIII -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)

1613-- The Two Noble Kinsmen -- William Shakespeare (1564-1616)

1620 -- Novum organum
 (1620) -- Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
1623 -- De argumentis scientarum (1623) -- Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
1625 -- Essays (1625) -- Francis Bacon (1561-1626)

1625 -- On the Law of War and Peace (1625) -- Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
1627 -- The New Atlantis (1627) -- Francis Bacon (1561-1626)

1644 -- Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) -- Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634)

1651 -- Leviathan (1651) -- Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) finished reading 03/29/2018
1656 -- Oceana (1656) -- James Harrington (1611-1677)

1660 -- The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth (1660) -- John Milton (1608-1674)
1661 --Elementa Jurisprudentiae universalis (1661) -- Samuel, Baron von Pufendorf (1632-1694)

1672 -- De jure naturae et gentium (1672) -- Samuel, Baron von Pufendorf (1632-1694)

1680 -- The Antient Right of the Commons of England Asserted (1680) -- William Petyt (1636-1707) 
1689 -- The Two Treatises of Civil Government (1689) -- John Locke (1632-1704)

1690s -- A Letter on Toleration An Essay concerning Human Understanding(1690s) -- John Locke (1632-1704)
1690 --An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) -- John Locke (1632-1704)
1691 --Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money (1691) -- John Locke (1632-1704)
1696 -- On the Reasonableness of Christianity (1696) -- John Locke (1632-1704)
1698 -- Discourses Concerning Government (1698) -- Algernon Sidney (1622-1683)
1698 -- A Short History of Standing Armies iin England (1698) -- John Trenchard and Moyle

1700s
1709 -- Vox populi, vox dei: Judgement of Kingdooms and Nations Concerning the Rights, Privileges, and Properties of the People (1709) -- John Somers (1651-1716)

1724 -- Cato's Letters (1724) -- John Trenchard (1662-1723) & Thomas Gordon (?-1750)
1728 -- The Dunciad (1728) -- Alexander Pope (1688-1744)

1731 -- Of False Taste
 (1731) -- Alexander Pope (1688-1744)
1731 -- History of England (1726-31) -- Paul de Rapiin-Thoyras (1661-1725)
1732 -- Of the Uses of Riches (1732) -- Alexander Pope (1688-1744)
1733 -- The Freeholder's Political Catechism (1733) -- Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)
1733 -- Letters on the English Nation (1733) -- Francois Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778)
1734 -- Persian Letters (1734) -- Montesquieu (1689-1755)
1734 -- Reflections on the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire (1734) -- Montesquieu (1689-1755)
1734 -- An Essay on Man (1733-34) -- Alexander Pope (1688-1744)
1735 -- A Dissertation Upon Parties (1735) -- Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)

1740 -- A Treatise of Human Nature
 (1739-1740) -- David Hume (1711-1776)
1740 -- Observations on the Romans (1740) -- Abbe Gabriel Mably (1709-1785)
1743 -- Remarks on the history of England (1743) -- Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)
1748 -- The Spirit of Laws (1748) -- Montesquieu (1689-1755) finished reading about 04/05/2018
1749 -- The Idea of a Patriot King (1749) -- Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)
1749 -- A Letter on the Spirit of Patriotism (1749) -- Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)

1751 -- An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1751) -- David Hume (1711-1776)
1751 -- Treatise: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) -- David Hume (1711-1776)
1751 -- Works (1751) -- Francois Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778)
1752 -- Political Discourses (1752) -- David Hume (1711-1776)
1752 -- Letters on the Study and Use of History (1752) -- Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751)
1754 -- Discourse on the Origin of the Inequality of Men (1754) -- Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)
1755 -- The Natural History of Religion (1755) -- David Hume (1711-1776)
1756 -- General History and State of Europe (1756) -- Francois Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778)
1759 -- History of Scotland (1759) -- William Robertson (1721-1793)

1760 -- The Law of Nations (1759-1760) -- Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767)
1762 -- History of England(1754-1762) -- David Hume (1711-1776)
1762 -- The Social Contract (1762) -- Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)
1762 -- Emile (1762) -- Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)
1764 -- An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1764) -- Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794)
1769 -- Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69) -- Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780)
1769 -- History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V (1769) -- William Robertson (1721-1793)

1770 -- Philosophical & Political History of ... the East & West Indies (1770) -- Abbe Guillaume Raynal (1713-1796)
1771 -- The Consitution of England (1771) -- Jean Louis Delolme (1740-1805)
1776 -- Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty (1776) -- Richard Price (1723-1791)

Post-Declaration of Independence -- Peri-American Revolution
1777 -- History of America (1777) -- William Robertson (1721-1793)
1779 -- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) -- David Hume (1711-1776)

1784 -- Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution (1784) -- Richard Price (1723-1791)
1784 -- Observations on the Government and Laws of the U.S. (1784) -- Abbe Gabriel Mably (1709-1785)

1790--Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) -- 
Edmund Burke

1800s
1835--Demoncracy in America, Vol.1 (1835) -- Alexis de Tocqueville
1840--Demoncracy in America, Vol.2 (1840) -- Alexis de Tocqueville

Other Authors Named, But Without Specific Works Mentioned
William Shakespeare (1564-1616) -- dates from https://www.thoughtco.com/list-of-shakespeare-plays-2985250
Plato (c. 427-347 BC) -- List from http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Plato.html
Coxe (Sir Edward Coke?)

Thursday, April 26, 2018

BOOK REVIEW#1: LEVIATHAN by Hobbes -- Intro.4

LEVIATHAN (or The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil)
By Thomas Hobbes
1651

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm


I've concluded my initial explanations and thoughts regarding Hobbes' proposed image of Leviathan, which comprises the first half of The Introduction. I've spent what I think to be a lot of time on this topic, and the majority of thought and writing went into my initial thoughts regarding Hobbes' description of where the subjects, or the general public, fit into Leviathan model. So much writing both surprised me, in that I wasn't originally intending to write so much on this paragraph, as I was merely reviewing the image and its parts; and yet didn't surprise me, as the proposed image of Leviathan obviously spurred me into deep thought regarding it and individual liberty (especially the comparison of the Riches of the People represent the Strength of Leviathan), unabashedly looking to the future of when we discuss the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. I thought that I was direct in my questions in response to Hobbes' words, but I never attempted to claim authoritative interpretation. I tried to maintain expressed in my writing the acknowledgement that I was responding to a very narrow selection of words from basically page 1 of a very large book. I also attempted to have frequent though hopefully not taxing amounts of clarification that I recognize I have a lot more book to read, deferring drawing conclusions pending Hobbes' upcoming explanations further clarifying his vision and positions. I anticipate therefore that we will refer back to my posts on The Introduction to see if we can answer the questions raised here as we read. As my learning increases, I reserve the right to alter and refine my interpretations, my thoughts, and my opinions. As always, I do not expect my reader to rely on what I have written describing what I have read for your opinions, but I will continue to post links to the text  (as above) for your reference, which approach I will try to continue throughout my BOOK Reviews, as often as I am able. 


Interjection: The Consent of the Governed

Before proceeding to the second half of The Introduction, may I share one last reflection from the first half of The Introduction, namely regarding Hobbes' brief comparison of "the Pacts and Covenants" which first "made, set together, and united" the "parts of this Body Politique" (that is, Leviathan). I hope that Hobbes describes in more detail his vision of the founding of Leviathan as we continue to read, because I currently have many questions at this point. Most importantly, who among the people got together and formed Leviathan? Was it the people as a whole? Was it a group of selected representatives? If so, how were these representatives selected? Is it a voting process at all? Is Leviathan envisioned to be the society's first government, as part of a reformation, as or as part of a revolution? In any case, how was it then determined who would be the Sovereign? How much power is delegated from the Body Politique to the central government? Overall, what is this process? 

Such a discussion would be important, in my opinion, because Hobbes seems to be hinting (at least at this point) at the idea of government by consent, a concept which appears in the Declaration of Independence, and one which I did not expect to glean from Hobbes who less than two paragraphs ago (in his The Introduction) characterized the ordinary citizen as merely the energy source of Leviathan. 

The concept of government by consent stems from the principle of natural law which is all men are created equal before the law, that is, the Law of Nature and Nature's God, who was the Creator of It. It is important to understand that 'natural law' as understood by the Founders not only included Physical law which described Man's body, the world in which He lived, and the various rules governing their interaction; but also a natural Moral law, which defined Good and Evil, which informed Man's conscience such to discern between Good and Evil in their thoughts and actions, then which exerts a moral force on the conscience of Man to perform Good behavior and refrain from engaging in Bad behavior; and that that Moral subset of natural law was just as active and unchanging as the Physical subset. For example, Morality was as unchanging as gravity for the Founders. Natural law therefore embraces the existence of absolute truth and everlasting principles. That is to say, principles that do not change with time or circumstance. We note also that, in the cases of both the Physical and Moral components of Natural law, neither was created, decided, or put in place by Man, but by Nature's Creator, and were certainly already in place by the time Man started organizing himself into societies and governments. 

It is important to note however that, as a general rule (ignoring, for a moment, examples of miracles found in Scripture), Man, encased in his physical body, has no choice in his adherence to the Physical laws of Nature. He cannot choose whether or not He falls if He jumps off a cliff. He cannot choose whether the fire burns His skin or whether His skin will permit the fire to burn it. And Physical laws are merciless, you could say that they are 'no respecter of persons.' For example, the acceleration of gravity does not change for man, woman, smart, dumb, famous, unknown, suicide, accident, adult, child, dog, cat, etc; and the same could be said for things like the length of the day, the change of seasons, the passage of time, or the aging of the body, just to name a few. 

Without a doubt a working knowledge and understanding of the Physical laws is advantageous in Man's pursuit for preservation and prosperity. Evading harm or death to oneself is one of Man's core motivations. Forgetting to obey or deliberating attempting to defy the Physical laws can potentially result in injury or death. On the other hand, understanding how various principles work together can allow Man to achieve feats previously unknown. For example, flight is not the defiance of the Physical law of gravity, but the correct application in the correct proportions of the applicable Physical principles, which in the case of flight includes velocity, air flow, air pressure, as well as gravity. The idea that there are benefits from knowledge about the Physical world (that is scientific knowledge) is generally well accepted, so I need not attempt to expound on that point further. What is most important for this discussion, however, is the acknowledgement that, at its core, our understanding of the Physical laws is an understanding of the different relationships they govern, nearly all of which can be generally summed up in the concept of cause and effect. And this is precisely what Science intends to pursue: improved understanding of the system of rules within which our Physical world functions, from the universal to the quantum levels. 

On the contrary, Man's relationship with the natural Moral law is different. It is similar to Man's relationship with the natural Physical law in the sense that the natural Moral Law is also a system of cause and effect, and therefore the forces of the Moral law exert pushes and pulls on the conscience of a person, in similar principle as the Physical forces act on the Physical body. They are also similar in the sense that the principles governing both the natural Physical law and the natural Moral law are eternal, or timeless, or unchanging with time, as previously mentioned. 

They are different however in the key sense that, while the Physical body always (except in instances of divine intervention) submits to the forces of the natural Physical law, such motions of Moral force on the conscience do not imminently result in the person performing the prompted Moral action(s). A person may feel that he/she should do something because it is morally correct to do so, but may nevertheless choose not to do it; and a person may feel that he/she should not do something because it is morally incorrect to do so, but may nevertheless choose to do it anyway. When it comes to the Moral law, there is a space between the cause (that is, the push of Nature's Morality on the conscience) and the effect (that is, the action toward which the person's conscience was being pushed by Nature's Morality) during which Man is endowed with the ability to choose whether to follow the dictates of the natural Morality law or not. In the LDS church, we refer to this ability to choose as "moral agency," and this inherent knowledge of good and evil, provided by the Moral subset of the Law of Nature (of which God is the Author), as "the light of Christ," which every human person possesses. 

This moral agency in every individual is one of the key elements that instills intrinsic value in every individual. Each person is valuable by Nature, capable of choosing his/her own way. Each person is to be respected as such. No person ought to be the tool or means to the ends of another. From there, we talk about natural rights "endowed by [our] Creator," which include Life, Liberty, and Property, and which Morality tells us we should not violate in others. How interesting it is to me that one of the fundamental assumptions of politics rooted in the philosophy of natural law is consistent with the common Christian phrase, "I am a Child of God!" Natural law acknowledges the divine nature of each person, and seek to respect that divine nature as much as possible when it comes to government.

Because of the intrinsic value of the individual, the only just formation of government therefore has as one of it's characteristics the individuals' consent to submit themselves to that government at the time of its creation. I therefore am curious how a people would willingly consent/submit to a form of government as described in Hobbes' Introduction, where they, in my opinion, will be reduced to the battery supply of the State. But part of me also wonders about whether I would be able to find such a State less Morally contemptible if Hobbes were to in fact consider it a necessary point that the people opt into creating a Leviathan. My initially thought is no. Maybe this means that consent of the governed, while necessary, is not the exclusive criteria for just government.