LETTER TO MISSIONARY#5

In my last letter, I mentioned that Socrates was condemned to die. But the execution was not swift. There were various delays to the execution. So Socrates waited in prison for his execution. During this time, he was visited by friends and family. Several of the Dialogues recorded by Plato were of these visits, Socrates conversing while he awaited execution.

This scenario inspired me to post the question to our family via Marco Polo: What would you talk about if you knew you were going to die?

I think the question prompts a question of priority, such as 'what do you think would be the most important things to talk about with those whom you would leave behind?'

In the secular world, my mind is turned to those "Last Lectures" which became so popular.

In the scriptures, I think of Father Lehi in the Book of Mormon giving his final words to members of his family at the beginning of 2 Nephi, especially his final words to his son Jacob in chapter 2, where he outlines the most succinct discourse on man's moral agency yet revealed.

The quotes of Socrates which I include here have another purpose, to illustrate how the honest mind can stumble onto both the right and wrong conclusions on topics of higher thing. I've included some section headings in bold for hopefully easier reading.

As a hint for comprehension, you may want to read these quote out loud.

1) THE SUBJECT OF THE BODY
a) The Philosopher Rejects the Body
And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. [...] For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring? [...] —let us discuss the matter among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

To be sure, replied Simmias.

Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?

Just so, he replied.

There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present inquiry if you and I can agree about it:—Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered Simmias.

And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?

I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and to turn to the soul.

Quite true.

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.

Very true.

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.

That is also true.

b) The Body is a Hinderance to Progression, Purification is to be rid of the Body

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Certainly, he replied.

Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

True.

Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,—when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being?

Certainly.

And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true.

Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?—and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?

Certainly.

And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge—who, if not he, is likely to attain the knowledge of true being?

What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias.

And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not while we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You would agree; would you not?

Undoubtedly, Socrates.

But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.

Certainly, replied Simmias.

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true, he said.

And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?

To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

That is true.

And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when it comes upon them.

Clearly.

And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at the matter thus:—if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and this was wisdom—and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death." (Plato, Phaedo)

Obviously, this is an example of the honest mind coming to the wrong conclusion (without revelation). In contrast, consider the following scriptures:
"And the spirit and the body are the soul of man. And the resurrection of the dead is the redemption of the soul." (D&C 88:15-16)
"What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? For ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God’s." (1 Corinthians 6:19-20)

2) OPPOSITES: DEATH V. RETURNING TO LIFE

"Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

Very true, replied Cebes.

Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.

True.

And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less.

Yes.

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.

Very true.

And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.

Of course.

And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?

Yes.

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?

Yes, he said.

And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words—they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?

Very true, he replied.

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?

True, he said.

And what is it?

Death, he answered.

And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have there their two intermediate processes also?

Of course.

Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Do you agree?

I entirely agree.

Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?

Yes.

And they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

What is generated from the living?

The dead.

And what from the dead?

I can only say in answer—the living.

Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?

That is clear, he replied.

Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?

That is true.

And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for surely the act of dying is visible?

Surely, he said.

What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? And shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?

Certainly, he replied.

And what is that process?

Return to life.

And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?

Quite true.

Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of which they come again.

Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.

And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.

What do you mean? he said.

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—what other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? (But compare Republic.)

There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true.

Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil." (Plato, Phaedo)

While I wouldn't say that Socrates is necessarily right in every aspect, his thought process here made me think of 2 Nephi 2:
"11 For it must needs be, that there is an opposition in all things. If not so, my firstborn in the wilderness, righteousness could not be brought to pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead, having no life neither death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility.
12 Wherefore, it must needs have been created for a thing of naught; wherefore there would have been no purpose in the end of its creation. Wherefore, this thing must needs destroy the wisdom of God and his eternal purposes, and also the power, and the mercy, and the justice of God.
13 And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. If ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness there be no happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness there be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not there is no God. And if there is no God we are not, neither the earth; for there could have been no creation of things, neither to act nor to be acted upon; wherefore, all things must have vanished away."

EXTRA: I just thought the following quote as cool when reading through the lens of the restored Gospel, particularly a reference from ancient Greece about "mysteries" (religious ceremonies performed in temples) thought to have consequences in the life to come. 

"Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For 'many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'—meaning, as I interpret the words, 'the true philosophers.' In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;—whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well." (Plato, Phaedo)

Hope you have a good week.

LETTER TO A MISSIONARY#4

In this letter, I wanted to share a part of my reading with you. I'm including extended quotes, as is my preference -- you know how much I prefer reading and sharing the primary sources rather than summarizing them, and while I must restrict myself to summarizing in regular conversation, the written medium I think allows me greater liberty to share primary-source material less so constrained. In this way, I challenge people's mental faculties to "stretch as high as the utmost heavens, and search into and contemplate the darkest abyss, and the broad expanse of eternity," as Joseph Smith wrote from Liberty Jail (History of the Church, 3:295–96; from a letter from Joseph Smith and others to Edward Partridge and the Church, Mar. 20, 1839, Liberty Jail, Liberty, Missouri).

That quote makes me think of a recent Facebook discussion I had regarding the following Tweet which one of our relatives had reposted:

Ed: Where should we eat? I say pizza.
Ann: Pizza!
Ty: Pizza!
Liz: This old shoe!
Ed: Ugh, guess we have to eat this old shoe again.
Ann: Why??
Ty: Liz is from WY. Her vote is worth 3.6x more than ours.
[End Scene}
This has been the Electoral College.

Without getting into details, I challenged this Tweet as an inaccurate description, or even definition, of Electoral College. It was recommended to me to "Don't think so much into it."

The part of my response which I think applicable to my current message was as follows "[The Electoral College] is a deeper and more subtle subject than [the author of this Tweet] gives it credit for, and light thinking will not be sufficient to wrap the mind around its principles, much less lend itself to formulate productive critiques, let alone 'better' principles. I do not think that it is unreasonable to properly understand the mechanism of and the reason for the institution you wish to criticize -- settling for [this Tweet's] infantile explanation of the Electoral College process (which would not be acceptable in an 8th Grade U.S. History course), and then the advice to not think so much about it, is what I don't understand."

In this sense, I find a parallel between learning about the Church (its doctrine, its policies, its history from dispensation to dispensation, its leaders, etc) and learning about our American heritage (i.e., the political and cultural principles and institutions of the United States) and our more broad Western heritage (i.e., those principles and heritage leading up to the Founding). The acknowledgement of deep things in both the spiritual and secular planes, the interconnectedness of the two, that deep things are necessary to understand, that it will take work to condition the mind to handle thinking about deep things, and that the necessity of the mind to practice pondering these deep things. Thinking on these things in reference to the above quote by Brother Joseph, I wonder whether one's capacity for deep thought isn't part of the idea behind when the Lord says “For he who is not able to abide the law of a celestial kingdom cannot abide a celestial glory;" as in one's power for thinking being part of what degree of God's glory a person can endure, after the question of worthiness.

From the secular side, I have been struck with the sheer volume of honest thinking that has already occurred in the history of the Western world -- thinking which has been preserved through the Ages, thinking which we can read today. As members of the restored Church, possessors of the fullness of the Gospel, we rightly revere the Bible, in spite of not always being translated correctly (Article of Faith 8), and missing what Nephi described as "plain and precious truths" (1 Nephi 13:20-26). And yet, the preservation of the Bible is a miracle in and of itself. It is one of the many subtlties of history, a lesson in the restraint from judgment based on light understanding -- it is without a doubt that the Catholic and Orthordox Churches are the apostate remnants of that popularly-called "original" Church restored at the time of Jesus Christ, and yet it cannot be denied that it was because of people (many of them members of either these churches or the branched Protestant churches) doing their best to follow God with the light and truth they had that nevertheless set the stage for the Restoration, including the compilation and preservation of the Bible.

And I can't help but feel that the Lord's hand was in the preservation of not just strictly theological knowledge, but also other branches of thinking through the ages; not that all of that thinking was correct, but knowing what is wrong helps us clarify what is right.

And I think that this story of Socrates is illustrative of this point. You probably know that Socrates was a very influential Greek philosopher in his day. He didn't write anything down, all of our records of him are from what his student Plato wrote down, mostly in the form of Dialogues. I want to share three extended quotes with you. As background, you need to know that Socrates was condemned to die by the city of Athens for teaching the people to be "atheist" (that was, to believe in gods not endorsed by the city-state) and for "corrupting the youth." The first extended passage I wanted to share is from the Apology of Socrates, which is Socrates' speech to defend himself before the Athenian tribunal.

"I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, 'Yes, Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you; there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All these rumours and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.' Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think that I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi—he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him—his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is,—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!—for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the 'Herculean' labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets;—because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.

This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god." (Plato, Apology [of Socrates])

You'll notice that Socrates basically sights revelation (a communication from heaven), as he understand it, as the source of his life's work, which was the pursuit of knowledge through questioning people. He is trying to obey his Deity, we would say God. But it was because of his obedience to that direction that he gained many enemies, because the men he questioned were frequently embarrassed, their pride hurt. He was basically put to death for following that revelation, by being accused of "corruption" and "atheism," trumped-up charges.

While of course, not a prophet, I cannot help but be reminded of the lives of many prophets when contemplating the persecution, trial, and unjust death of Socrates.

I will stop here, but include the other two extended quotes in other letters.

Untitled#1

I have been carrying this thought in my head for some time. I think that it is time to write it down and make it more permanent. I mentioned in my initial posts that I would not hesitate to cite my religious faith in my writings, so I hope that my next few thoughts will not catch my readers off guard. I am a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. And I have decided that there are at least two books that I need to write. I list them as follows in no particular order:

The first book will be a historical review of political and theological thought of my Church. This book was inspired by a number of things. On the one hand, when the spark for political thought was first flinted in my heart, I was touched by the centrality of choice at the root of most political discussion, and the warmth that I felt was a recognition of the parallel we find in that moral agency is central to the Grand Design of God. The philosophy of natural law, both physical and moral, as well as the reverence for the divine worth of the individual, captivated my imagination, and caused my heart to burn. I felt a drive, both to learn more and to some day enter the public discourse to share the glories of that tender plant of freedom that I had newly learned to value. 

Another inspiration was the growing discovery that history is complicated, and the route that we traveled is not a straight one. Edmund Burke felt that history was the unscrolling of the Grand Design. We would all like to think that we are on the right side of history, in the sense that our version of history is the correct one, often times ceasing our research once we find the answer that supports our political philosophy. We do not often dig deep enough to find the contemporary opposition arguments on the same topic. As a people, and perhaps a culture, I think we take for granted the amount of thinking that has already been done in the past three to four thousand years. There seem to be few of today's questions that have not been previously addressed somewhere. 

Another inspiration was the Founding Fathers' Library, which I am still trying to read.

Branching off the idea that history complicated, another inspiration has been the political history of the Church and the Church's involvement in State and National affairs. In my research, I have read lots of facts that I do not have an explanation for -- I know that Pres. Ezra Taft Benson was vehemently conservative politically, and did not shy away from the topic at the pulpit. I know also that Pres. Benson was very active in the John Birch Society, which was considered too extreme for conservatives like Bill Buckley to include in his coalition. I know that the Church holds a stance of neutrality during elections. I know also that there was one presidential election where the president of the Church encouraged the Saints to vote one way, in 1936, when President Heber J. Grant counseled the Saints to vote against Roosevelt for his second term -- the state of Utah voted for FDR in that election. I know that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff is typically listed as one of the causes of the Great Depression, and that the Smoot of the Smoot-Hawley was Reed Smoot, Apostle of the Church. I know that there is a Priesthood Instruction Manuel from the 1930s that supports wealth redistribution schemes, and that the Self-Reliance courses today encourage individual responsibility and thrift. A relative provided a list of quotes, mostly by Brigham Young from the Journal of Discourses, under the title "Brigham or Bernie," implying that Church doctrine has always been progressive in nature. These are difficult questions, ones for which I do not have an answer, and from which I have not yet drawn conclusion. And this is not a comprehensive list. As I said, history is complicated.

My point is that I do not want to shy away from these topics. I refuse to believe that people who disagree with me are my de facto enemies. I would like to believe that we are all trying the best we can to make sense of this world and what happens in it, that we should be less quick to judge, be more patient with one another, and not be afraid to tackle the intellectually and morally relevant contentions between differing philosophies. I have felt that as I learn, that I should write, and that perhaps they may be of some good to my fellow man and to future generations. I have never before felt such an awareness of future generations, and my role as link between the previous generation before and the generations after, and how much influence can be had by writing it down. I feel constrained to figure out a system for myself of learning the history, the ideas, the theories, the doctrines, the policies, and then writing down my thoughts as I go. Perhaps the most important thing about this post is that I seem to be giving myself permission to be a little less formal with my blog posts, so that hopefully I can make more frequent postings. More quotes from my audiobook, which I do so faithfully on my Facebook page. 

The second book is my full review of the musical Hamilton. I will call the book, Hamilton: The Founding of the Diverse America. It is an intellectual battle that should be fought.

As I have said in another place, I have left many people perplexed by expressing that I find a certain spiritual fulfillment in the study of politics. 

QUOTE THOUGHT #2

Dr. Richard Price gave a sermon in 1789, later published as A Discourse on the Love of Our Country.

In his Reflection on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke described the sermon as "a very extraordinary miscellaneous sermon, in which there are some good moral and religious sentiments, and not ill expressed, mixed up with a sort of porridge of various political opinions and reflections: but the Revolution in France is the grand ingredient in the caldron." 

At one point in his sermon, Dr. Price says ""Those who dislike that mode of worship which is prescribed by public authority ought, if they can find no worship out of the Church which they approve, to set up a separate worship for themselves; and by doing this, and giving an example of a rational and manly worship, men of weight from their rank and literature may do the greatest service to society and the world." (pg. 18)

To this, Burke observed:

"It is somewhat remarkable that this reverend divine should be so earnest for setting up new churches, and so perfectly indifferent concerning the doctrine which may be taught in them. His zeal is of a curious character. It is not for the propagation of his own opinions, but of any opinions. It is not for the diffusion of truth, but for the spreading of contradiction. Let the noble teachers but dissent, it is no matter from whom or from what. This great point once secured, it is taken for granted their religion will be rational and manly. I doubt whether religion would reap all the benefits which the calculating divine computes from this "great company of great preachers." It would certainly be a valuable addition of nondescripts to the ample collection of known classes, genera, and species, which at present beautify the hortus siccus of Dissent. A sermon from a noble duke, or a noble marquis, or a noble earl, or baron bold, would certainly increase and diversify the amusements of this town, which begins to grow satiated with the uniform round of its vapid dissipations. I should only stipulate that these new Mess-Johns in robes and coronets should keep some sort of bounds in the democratic and levelling principles which are expected from their titled pulpits. The new evangelists will, I dare say, disappoint the hopes that are conceived of them. They will not become, literally as well as figuratively, polemic divines,—nor be disposed so to drill their congregations, that they may, as in former blessed times, preach their doctrines to regiments of dragoons and corps of infantry and artillery. Such arrangements, however favorable to the cause of compulsory freedom, civil and religious, may not be equally conducive to the national tranquillity."

While they are clearly speaking about religion, I am nevertheless caught by the possible parallel between Price's call and appraisal of apparently any worship is good worship and helpful to the society, and the modern phrases "dissent is patriotic" or "protest is patriotic." It seems to me that the critique could be similar, that "it is taken for granted their [protest] will be rational and manly." 

Freedom of speech is good, but dissent and protest do not imbue patriotism. Not all speech, all reforms, or all causes are patriotic, and unpatriotic causes are not made patriotic be being the topic of a protest. Being able to express oneself is good, but it does not follow that everything is equally good, either moral, or equally prudent for the community at the time. It is true that Government ought not to control speech, but this does put additional responsibility on the heads of the individuals to use exercise that responsibility prudently.  

QUOTE THOUGHTS#1

"Those who cultivate the memory of our Revolution, and those who are attached to the Constitution of this kingdom, will take good care how they are involved with persons who, under the pretext of zeal towards the Revolution and Constitution, too frequently wander from their true principles, and are ready on every occasion to depart from the firm, but cautious and deliberate, spirit which produced the one and which presides in the other." (Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790)

I understand that when Mr. Burke speaks of the "Revolution" and the "Constitution" in this quote, he is speaking about the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the English Constituion. And yet, without editing the quote, beyond admittedly removing it from its context, I cannot help but feel that it could used just as well by me to advise my fellow citizens regarding the American Revolution and the Constitution of the United States. 

LETTER TO A MISSIONARY#1, 7/7/2019

Dear ---,

I wanted to share an experience I had on 4th of July this year. 

First, the setting: We ourselves did not buy fireworks to light off ourselves, for two reasons: 1) they are expensive, and 2) we still don't quite trust our kids at close proximity to fireworks. Besides that, Child1 was up at Gram-E Fun Days, Child2 feel asleep as 7:30p after a holiday of hard playing, and Child3 is too young to understand. So, Wife and I shared a Martinelli outside on our front swing, getting glimpses of near-by fireworks, both ground-based and aerial, lighting off. I was carrying Child3, whose head was turning every which way trying to see what was making the popping sounds. For the record, I had gone in to try and wake up Child2 for fireworks (because he had been asking about fireworks for the last week, and we didn't want him to miss them if we would help): he opened his eyes, even sat up, but then laid back down and went to sleep, and didn't wake up again until mid-morning next day. 

Anyway, so I'm still thinking about the meaning of the experience, so bear with me. I hope I can explain it properly. I was standing with Child3, watching the fireworks, during which the lyrics "And the rocket’s red glare, the bombs bursting in air" came to mind. Then I thought, whereas these 'rockets' and 'bombs' are actually fireworks, that the rockets and bombs would have been provided by cannonfire at the battle where these word were written (Fort McHenry, 1814). At that point, the words of Isaiah came to mind: "swords into plow-shares" (Isaiah 2:3-4; 2 Nephi 12:3-4)  -- the fireworks are in a sense reenacting the artillery of that battle, but this time in celebration and peace. I realize that fireworks are not exclusively an American invention or tradition, and the Fourth of July was not the first holiday for which fireworks were used (as far as I know); but this thought nevertheless stood out to me. I'll continue to ponder it, but would of course welcome your insight. 

In addition, at a time when the people of the United States struggle to identify common ground between the factions, I realized that the fireworks may be one of those traditions that we could look to in order to help bridge the gaps. I acknowledge that this may seem a shallow contribution to a purported solution to such a deep problem. May I answer that by sharing an experience from my mission: Looking back, there was a stretch right around my one-year mark where I was depressed and my self-esteem was very low. It was a struggle to go out and work. I knew that something had to change. During the Mother's Day phone call, Mom told me two things -- 1) discouragement is not a gift of the Spirit, and 2) when you struggle moving forward, it is important to look back where you've been to see how far the Lord has brought you. I remember taking two or three days' worth of personal study sessions dedicated to making a list of ten things I liked about myself. And, in my opinion, those first reasons I came up with were shallow but undeniable. For example, I like that I like music so much. I'm not embarrassed to use the words "shallow" or "simple" to describe those first items on my list. They nevertheless were the first steps towards healing from the low and forging a new sense of self-worth. Perhaps we could say that civility in the United States, the mood of her people, is low. And something so simple as fireworks may seem trivial, but it could also be tapping into a tradition, an established stitching in the design of the social fabric, where people can come together and have positive experiences together. Like the song, "Breakfast at Tiffany's," "and I said, 'well that's one thing we've got.'" Finding these things in common will be important for the future. 

"[...]The Second Day of July 1776, will be the most memorable Epocha, in the History of America. I am apt to believe that it will be celebrated, by succeeding Generations, as the great anniversary Festival. It ought to be commemorated, as the Day of Deliverance by solemn Acts of Devotion to God Almighty. It ought to be solemnized with Pomp and Parade, with Shews, Games, Sports, Guns, Bells, Bonfires and Illuminations from one End of this Continent to the other from this Time forward forever more. You will think me transported with Enthusiasm but I am not. -- I am well aware of the Toil and Blood and Treasure, that it will cost Us to maintain this Declaration, and support and defend these States. -- Yet through all the Gloom I can see the Rays of ravishing Light and Glory. [...]"

(John Adams, Letter to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776)

I have since been burdened with a question: How do we make the Spirit of the 4th of July last all year long, in the tradition of the desire to devise how we might make the Spirit of Christmas last all year round, or the Spirit of Remembrance during Easter time? I have no definitive answer, although I did find that the Declaration of Independence on audiobook is only ten to eleven minutes, and the Constitution under an hour including amendments. Perhaps a more frequent reading of them would help us to remember them better. I am not sure what your mission rules are, but you might ask whether some limited study of these documents would be appropriate, since the documents have historically been praised by the Church as 'inspired documents.' Just as the Book of Mormon is not greater than the Bible but it nevertheless has particular relevance to the Restoration and to the member's testimony of the reality of Joseph Smith's calling and the truthfulness of the restored Gospel, the United States is not greater than other nations in the sense that being in the United States improves chances of salvation (of in this sense, God without a doubt is no respecter of persons), but there is no doubt that the United States holds a special heritage as the location furnishing the circumstances necessary to allow the Restoration to both take place and take root. 

I hope that you will absorb your surroundings -- the people of Arizona, those of the Native American reservations, the immigrants, their history, their culture, their values, their concerns. Knowing the people helps you know how to teach the Gospel.

"History is the record of Providence at work[...]--mysterious though God's ways often are for us." -- Russell Kirk, summarizing the belief of Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke: A Genius Reconsidered, Ch.2

I love you lots. Think as deep as possible, use as few words as possible, but as many as necessary, as the Spirit whispers. Be careful in the heat.

Me


P.S. I also wanted to share the following story, told during the US Bicentennial. The first paragraph is an introduction I wrote when I posted this story on my Facebook:

We draw close again to the 4th of July, which will be the 243rd anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, originally signed in 1776. While readers will note that this quote is about the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, not the Declaration, I think it is nevertheless just the sort of quote to kindle healthy patriotism in the heart's stove of gratitude, yet also provoke the quiet introspection that is sweet to the reasoning mind. The quote is lengthier, but worth I hope. Enjoy!

"That product [of the Convention of 1787] did not contain that portion of the Constitution that most lawyers have occasion to invoke with any frequency, the Bill of Rights, that was added, as you know, [in 1789] on the proposal of the First Congress as the first ten amendments. Although the understanding that something like that sort would be added was almost a condition of ratification by several of the States. Nonetheless, it is paradoxical, is it not, that what was an afterthought should have before the most celebrated feature of the Constitution. Because in the commemorations of the Bicentennial that have been going on and that will continue for a few more years, the specific provisions of the Constitution that are normally given the most extensive if not indeed the exclusive praise are not the bicamerality of the Legislature, or the separate election of the President, or the presidential veto power, or life tenure for judges, or the brief two-year term for members of the House, or the six-year term for the members of the Senate, or any of the other expertly crafted provisions that pertain to the structure, that is to say the constitution, of the government; but rather, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and so forth, provisions of the subsequently adopted Bill of Rights -- so completely does that portion of the document attract the affection and devotion of the people. But the fact is that if the virtue of the Constitution is to be assessed on the virtue of that feature, one must admit that the Constitution of the United States fares rather badly.

Take, for example, protections against governmental intrusion upon privacy. The United States Bill of Rights contains no more explicit protection than the following: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Compare that with the much more explicit and extensive guarantees of a modern constitution, which reads: "Citizens...are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No one may be arrested except by a court decision or on the warrant of a procurator. Citizens...are guaranteed inviolability of the home. No one may, without lawful grounds, enter a home against the will of those residing in it. The privacy of citizens, and of their correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications is protected by law."

Or consider freedom of religion. Our first amendment says no more than the following, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]"

Compare that the prominent modern constitution, which reads: "Citizens ... are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or atheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited."

Or freedom of speech and assembly, as to which the United States Constitution says only "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Compare that poultry guarantee with the modern constitution I have been describing, which says: "[Citizens] ... are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations[.] [Citizens] ... have the right to associate in public organisations that promote their political activity and initiative and satisfaction of their various interests[.] Persecution for criticism [of state bodies and public organisations] is prohibited. Persons guilty of such persecution shall be called to account."

You will see the point that I have been driving towards, in fact I suspect you may have guessed it, when I tell you that the 'modern constitution' I have been describing is that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I would not trade our old Constitution for that in a million years. And if I had to pick a country other than my own in which I thought my individual rights would be most secure, I might well select England or Australia, both of which are among the significant holdouts in the universal movement toward Bills of Rights, they have none. The reason, of course, is that a Bill of Rights only has value if the other part of the Constitution, the part that really constitutes the organs of government, establishes a structure that is likely to preserve against the ineradicable human lust of power the liberties the Bill of Rights expresses. If the people value those liberties, the proper constitutional structure will likely result in their preservation even in the absence of a Bill of Rights, which is what Madison argued at the Convention. And where that structure does not exist, the mere recitation of the liberties will certainly not preserve them.

So while it is entirely appropriate for us Americans in this Bicentennial of our Founding as a nation to celebrate and decorate our wonderful Bill of Rights, we should realize that it represents the fruits, and not the root, of our Constitutional Tree. The rights that it expresses ... are the reasons that the other provisions exist. It is those other provisions, however, those hum-drum provisions, the structural mechanistic portions of the Constitution, that in James Madison's words, "pit ambition against ambition and make it impossible for any element of government to obtain unchecked power." It is those hum-drum provisions that convert the Bill of Rights from a paper assurance to a living guarantee." 

Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, "Reflections on the Constitution," held as part of the 200th Anniversary Celebration of the Constitution, delivered at American University on November 20, 1988, lecture sponsored by the Kennedy Political Union, broadcasted as part of C-SPAN series, America & The Courts

FFL Quotes: Laws, Book I of XII, by Plato, ~360BC

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm#link2H_4_0004

ATHENIAN: "Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the author of your laws?"

ATHENIAN: "[First], I want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms.
 CLEINIAS: I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to any one. Look at the character of our country: Crete is not like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horsemen in Thessaly, and we have runners—the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have runners you must have light arms—no one can carry a heavy weight when running, and bows and arrows are convenient because they are light. Now all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to this in all his arrangements:—the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the case compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection. He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always at war with one another; and if in war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly appointed under others to protect an army, they should be continued in peace. For what men in general term peace would be said by him to be only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if you look closely, you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view to war; in giving them he was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.
ATHENIAN: You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a well-governed state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am I right in supposing this to be your meaning?
CLEINIAS: Certainly[.]
ATHENIAN: And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to villages?
CLEINIAS: To both alike.
ATHENIAN: The case is the same?
CLEINIAS: Yes.
ATHENIAN: And in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual?
CLEINIAS: The same.
ATHENIAN: And should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy:—what shall we say?
CLEINIAS: O Athenian Stranger—inhabitant of Attica I will not call you, for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself, because you go back to first principles,—you have thrown a light upon the argument, and will now be better able to understand what I was just saying,—that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man privately his own. [...]Moreover, there is a victory and defeat—the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats—which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us."

ATHENIAN: "[...] Seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?
CLEINIAS: You mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self.
ATHENIAN: Yes.
CLEINIAS: You are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.
ATHENIAN: [...] I now quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good."

ATHENIAN: "[...] We are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws."

ATHENIAN: "Now, which would be the better judge—one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.

CLEINIAS: The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.

ATHENIAN: And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war.

CLEINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, every one would wish to be quit of as soon as possible?

CLEINIAS: He would have the latter chiefly in view.

ATHENIAN: And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established, and that, being reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies?

CLEINIAS: Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state.

ATHENIAN: And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?

CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the best?

CLEINIAS: To be sure.

ATHENIAN: But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace."

ATHENIAN: "I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest."

ATHENIAN: "[...] A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds,—one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of warfare."

ATHENIAN: "[...] You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth rate (i.e., it ranks after justice, temperance, and wisdom.).
CLEINIAS: Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank which is far beneath him.
ATHENIAN: Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete mainly with a view to war."

ATHENIAN: "What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence;—that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters. But we maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition; for you were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of virtue [.]"

ATHENIAN: "The Cretan laws are with reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every sort of good. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the greater, has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god (Pluto), but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another, and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all this, and consider where justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things,—some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject [.]"

ATHENIAN: "But how ought we to define courage? Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax?
MEGILLUS: I should say the latter."

ATHENIAN: Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?
CLEINIAS: I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is overcome by pain.
ATHENIAN: But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right?
CLEINIAS: Able to meet both, I should say.
ATHENIAN: Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them, and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the better of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is of this nature among you:—What is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?
MEGILLUS: I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there are some lesser provisions, however, which I might mention.
CLEINIAS: Neither can I show anything of that sort which is at all equally prominent in the Cretan laws."

ATHENIAN: "I will not at present determine whether he who censures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will be the law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are right or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree that the laws are all good, for they came from God; and any one who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who remarks any defect in your laws may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no young man is present.
CLEINIAS: Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator, and to say what is most true.
ATHENIAN: As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these very matters now that we are alone.
CLEINIAS: True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong; he who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be all the better for it."

ATHENIAN: "[...] For you are the only people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amusements and never to touch them; whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided pains and fears and sorrows, when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were hardened in them, and would become their subjects. Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure; he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasures, and unused to endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear would overcome the former class; and in another, and even a worse manner, they will be the slaves of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free; and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen."

CLEINIAS: "On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters would be very childish and simple."

ATHENIAN: "There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, with regard to states, in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no dispute about them. [Another translation: There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, in so ordering acts and words in politics that there should be no dispute about them.] As in the human body, the regimen which does good in one way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that any one course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia and common meals [as mandated in Crete] do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of the Milesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the beasts. The charge may be fairly brought against your cities above all others, and is true also of most other states which especially cultivate gymnastics. Whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously, I think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse between men and women; but that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of having invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in individuals: these are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from them where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this holds of men and animals—of individuals as well as states; and he who indulges in them ignorantly and at the wrong time, is the reverse of happy."

ATHENIAN: "[We] cannot say that victory or defeat in battle affords more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. For when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the Syracusans have done the Locrians, who appear to be the best-governed people in their part of the world, or as the Athenians have done the Ceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the same sort of thing), all this is not to the point; let us endeavour rather to form a conclusion about each institution in itself and say nothing, at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that such and such a custom is honourable, and another not."

ATHENIAN: "All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to proceed in a wrong way. Let me give you an illustration of what I mean:—You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind of food, whereupon another person instantly blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with what, or in what state and how, wheat is to be given. And that is just what we are doing in this discussion. At the very mention of the word intoxication [or whatever topic], one side is ready with their praises and the other with their censures; which is absurd. For either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak with authority because we have many witnesses; and others because they see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this again is disputed by us. Now I cannot say that I shall be satisfied, if we go on discussing each of the remaining laws in the same way. And about this very point of intoxication [or whatever topic] I should like to speak in another way[.]"

ATHENIAN: "If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus—when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer is easy—that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are good. Education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education; for many have grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is never suicidal."

ATHENIAN: "[I] will try to find a way of explaining my meaning, and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me."

ATHENIAN: "To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given to man, Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions."

MEGILLUS: O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not know, that our family is the proxenus of your state. I imagine that from their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the proxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country; and this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from the days of my boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed the Athenians, they used to say to me,—'See, Megillus, how ill or how well,' as the case might be, 'has your state treated us'; and having always had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you assailed, I became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature, and is not manufactured. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say.

ATHENIAN: "[...] At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysus. [...] According to my view, any one who would be good at anything must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in its several branches: for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children's houses; he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; and those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. They should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise, for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. [...] Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives."

 MEGILLUS: "[The] common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature, and is not manufactured." Or as the Introduction clarifies: " A good Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because he is inspired by nature and not manufactured by the law."

ATHENIAN: And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not.

ATHENIAN: "Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?

CLEINIAS: We do.

ATHENIAN: And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain.

CLEINIAS: Exactly.

ATHENIAN: Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.
CLEINIAS: I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.
MEGILLUS: I am in the like case.
ATHENIAN: Let us look at the matter thus: May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose—which of the two we cannot certainly know? But we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the meaning of the expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary."

ATHENIAN: "[...]Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different? [...] There is the fear of expected evil [, and] there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame. [...] These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures. [...] And does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear [that of evil reputation] in the greatest honour? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states. [...] Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? For there are two things which give victory—confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace before friends. [...] Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why we should be either has now been determined. [...] And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears. [...] And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms against them, and to overcome them? Or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his own natural character,—since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been,—and are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, by word, deed, and act, will still be perfectly temperate?"

ATHENIAN: And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.